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CASE NOTE
Administrative Law-GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTS-PUBLIC
UTILITIES SUPPLYING
SERVICES
TO GOVERNMENT
AGENCIES
AREGOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS
SUBJECT
TO NONDISCRIMINATION
PROVISIONS
OF

EXECUTIVE
ORDER11,246-United States v. New Orleans Public
Service, Inc., 553 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1977), petition for cert. filed,
46 U.S.L.W. 3243 (U.S. Sept. 30, 1977) (No. 77-497).
For many years New Orleans Public Service, Inc., (NOPSI)
has supplied electricity and natural gas to various governmental
agencies in and around New Orleans.' In 1973 the United States
Department of Justice brought an action to compel NOPSI, a
public utility, to comply with the contractual obligations imposed by Executive Order 11,2462and the rules and regulations
issued pursuant t h e r e t ~ Executive
.~
Order 11,246 prohibits employment discrimination by government contractors and requires
that they take affirmative action to ensure equal employment
~pportunity.~
The Order also requires a contractor to keep extensive employment records and to file those records with the contracting agency or Secretary of Labor .5
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana held that NOPSI was a government contractor and was
therefore subject to the obligations imposed by the Executive
Order and its implementing rules and regulation^.^ The court
issued an order enjoining the utility from failing to comply with
Executive Order 11,246.' The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that a public utility which has
a local monopoly on the sale of natural gas or electricity and
which sells energy to the federal government can be required to
1. United States v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 553 F.2d 459,462 (5th Cir. 1977),
petition for cert. filed, 46U.S.L.W. 3243 (U.S. Sept. 30,1977) (No. 77-497). In 1973NOPSI
supplied federal users with more than $2,680,000 worth of electrical and natural gas
service. Id. at 462.
2. 3 C.F.R. 173 (1973), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e app., a t 10,294 (1970) (original
version at 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 Compilation)).
3. 41 C.F.R. 6 60-1 (1976), as amended by 42 Fed. Reg. 3457 (1977). See note 32 and
accompanying text infra.
4. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 5 202,3 C.F.R. 173 (l973), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e
app., at 10,294 (1970).
5. Id. 5 203.
6. United States v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. fi 9795, 8 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 1089 (E.D. La. 1974), aff'd, 553 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1977), petition for
cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3243 (U.S. Sept. 30, 1977) (No. 77-497).
7. Id. a t 6331, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1106-07.
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comply with the equal opportunity obligations of Executive Order
11,246, even though the utility has not expressly consented to be
bound by the Order?

A. Nondiscrimination Provisions i n Executive Orders
In response to mounting pressure from civil rights groupsg
and because of an acute shortage of labor in the defense industries, President Roosevelt in 1941 issued Executive Order 8802.1°
The Order required that all procurement contracts related to defense contain a clause prohibiting the contractor from discriminating against any worker because of race, creed, color, or national origin." Executive Order 9001 reaffirmed the objectives of
Order 8802 and further provided that where a nondiscrimination
clause is not expressly contained in a defense contract, it will
nevertheless be deemed to be incorporated by reference.12Executive Order 9346, issued in 1943, substantially expanded this coverage by requiring the inclusion of the nondiscrimination provision in contracts entered into by all contracting government agencies and by specifically directing that government contractors, in
turn, include the clause in all related subcontract^.^^ Subsequent
executive orders issued by Presidents Truman and Eisenhower
did not diminish these requirements.14
The expansive trend of former executive pronouncements
continued when President Kennedy ordered that government
contractors and contractors engaged in federally assisted construction projects take affirmative action to ensure equal employment opportunity.15 The President's Committee on Equal Em8. 553 F.2d at 461. While the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision,
the injunction against NOPSI was lifted. The court ruled that the regulations should first
be enforced administratively and that the district court's injunctive powers should be
invoked only when administrative remedies fail. Id. at 474.
In considering NOPSI, the Court of Appeals joined the case with United States v.
Mississippi Power & Light Co., 553 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1977). While the factual background
in Mississippi differs from that in NOPSI, the issues presented in both cases are identical,
and the court reached similar holdings.
RACE,JOBS,AND POLITICS
17-21 (1953).
9. L. RUCHAMES,
10. 3 C.F.R. 957 (1938-1943 Compilation).
11. Id.
12. Exec. Order No. 9001, tit. II, Q 2, 3 C.F.R. 1054 (1938-1943 Compilation).
13. Exec. Order No. 9346, 3 C.F.R. 1280 (1938-1943 Compilation).
14. E.g., Exec. Order No. 10,479, 3 C.F.R. 961 (1949-1953Compilation); Exec. Order
No. 10,210, pt. I, fi 7, 3 C.F.R. 390 (1949-1953 Compilation); Exec. Order No. 9664, 3
C .F.R. 480 (1943-1948 Compilation).
15. Exec. Order No. 11,114, 3 C.F.R. 774 (1959-1963 Compilation); Exec. Order No.
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ployment Opportunity (CEEO) was created to administer the
new requirement and to develop whatever provisions the committee deemed necessary to accomplish the purposes of the orders.'"
In 1965, President Johnson continued the nondiscrimination program through Executive Order 11,246 which abolished the CEEO
and authorized the Secretary of Labor to adopt appropriate rules
and regulations relating to the Order.'' Executive Order 11,375
later extended the nondiscrimination requirement to prohibit sex
discrimination by government contractor^.^^

B. The Validity of Executive Order 11,246
1. Executive control over federal procurement
The federal government has the right to set the terms and
conditions upon which it will do business.lgIn Perkins v. Lukens
Steel Co.,20 the Supreme Court stated: "Like private individuals
and businesses, the Government enjoys the unrestricted power to
produce its own supplies, to determine those with whom it will
deal, and to fix the terms and conditions upon which it will make
needed purchase^."^^ This statement reflects the generally accepted rule which recognizes that the government is entitled to
those rights accorded any contracting party.22
The President has been given specific statutory authority
over federal procurement procedures by 40 U.S.C. Section
486(a).23 That authority, when considered with the Perkins dic10,925, § 301, 3 C.F.R. 448 (1959-1963 Compilation).
16. Exec. Order No. 10,925, $ 4 101, 103, 3 C.F.R. 448 (1959-1963 Compilation).
17. Exec. Order No. 11,246, § 201,3 C.F.R. 174 (1973), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. 4 2000e
app., at 10,294 (1970) (original version a t 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 Compilation)). The
Department of Labor's Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC) assumed the responsibility of enforcing compliance with the equal employment provisions. 41 C.F.R. §
60-1.2 (1976). The Director of the OFCC has the responsibility of "carrying out the responsibilities assigned to the Secretary under [Executive Order 11,2461, except the power to
issue rules and regulations of a general nature." Id.
18. Exec. Order No. 11,375, 3 C.F.R. 684 (1966-1970 Compilation).
19. See Reich, The New Property, 73 YALEL.J. 733, 740-41 (1964).
20. 310 U.S. 113 (1940). At issue was the validity of a determination made by the
Secretary of Labor pursuant to the Public Contracts Act of 1936, 41 U.S.C. $ § 35-45
(1970), which authorized the establishment of a minimum wage standard for government
suppliers.
21. 310 U.S. at 127 (dictum).
22. See Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 854 (1971); Printing Specialties Local 604 v. Union Camp Corp., 350 F. Supp.
632 (S.D. Ga. 1972); Southern Ill. Builders Ass'n v. Ogilvie, 327 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D. Ill.
1971), aff'd, 471 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1972).
23. 40 U.S.C. 8 486(a) (1970). This statute is a section of the Federal Property and
Administrative Service Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-152,63 Stat. 377 (codified in scattered
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tum, indicates that the President may determine the terms and
conditions upon which the government will enter into ~ontracts.~"
2. Judicial approval of Executive Order 11,246
Executive authority to impose nondiscrimination provisions
in government contracts has been consistently upheld by the
courts. Citing the federal government's "vital interest in assuring
that the largest possible pool of qualified manpower be available
for the accomplishment of its projects," the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Contractors Association v.
Secretary of LaboP concluded that inclusion of the nondiscrimination provision of Executive Order 11,246 in federal contracts
was within the implied authority of the P r e ~ i d e n tIn
. ~ Southern
~
Illinois Builders Association v. Ogilvie,27 a federal district judge
upheld an affirmative action program imposed by the Governor
of Illinois pursuant to, inter alia, Executive Order 11,246: "The
Executive Order and its predecessors have the full force and effect
of law."28Other courts have reached similar holdings, and none
to date have attacked the Order.29

C. Regulations Issued Pursuant to Executive Order 11,246
Following the directive of Executive Order 11,246," the Secretary of Labor has issued rules and regulations to implement its
provision^.^^ The regulations specify that the equal opportunity
clause will be considered a part of every government contract and
subcontract, whether or not the contract is written and whether
sections of 5, 15,40, 41, 44 U.S.C.). The purpose of the Act is to "provide for the Government an economical and efficient system for (a) the procurement and supply of personal
property and nonpersonal services . . ." Id. 8 2, 40 U.S.C. 5 471 (1970).
24. The Perkins dictum applies to the government generally. The courts merely use
40 U.S.C. § 486(a) (1970) as a means of applying the dictum to the President specifically.
See United States v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 553 F.2d 459, 465-69 (5th Cir. 1977),
petition for cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3243 (U.S. Sept. 30, 1977) (No. 77-497).
25. 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U S . 854 (1971).
26. Id. a t 171.
27. 327 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D. Ill. 1971), aff'd,471 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1972).
28. Id. at 1162.
29. The Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the issue of the Executive
Order's validity, although in at least one instance certiorari has been denied where the
lower court ruled in favor of the Order. Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d
159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied. 404 U S . 854 (1971).
30. Exec. Order 11,246, § § 201, 204-05, 3 C.F.R. 173 (1973), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. §
2000e app., at 10,294 (1970).
31. 41 C.F.R. 5 60-1 (1976)' as amended by 42 Fed. Reg. 3457 (1977) and 42 Fed. Reg.
5978 (1977).
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or not the clause is physically incorporated in the contract.32The
regulations define a government contract as being:
[Alny agreement or modification thereof between any contracting agency and any person for the furnishing of supplies or
services or for the use of real or personal property, including
lease arrangements. The term "services", as used in this section
includes, but is not limited to the following services: Utility,
construction, transportation, research, insurance, and fund dep0sita1-y.~~

The regulations indicate certain conditions that may exempt a
contractor from compliance with the program.34None of the exemptions, however, are applicable to NOPSI in the instant case.
The regulations also provide that the Director of the Office of
Federal Contract Compliance may institute an administrative
enforcement proceeding3=or refer the matter to the Department
of Justice to enforce the contractual provisions of the Order.36
32. Id. 4 60-1.4(e). The equal opportunity clause which is included in every contract
reads in part:
During the performance of this contract, the contractor agrees as follows:
(1) The contractor will not discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The
contractor will take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed,
and that employees are treated during employment, without regard to their
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Such action shall include, but not
be limited to the following: Employment, upgrading, demotion, or transfer,
recruitment or recruitment advertising; layoff or termination; rates of pay or
other forms of compensation; a.nd selection for training, including apprenticeship . . . .

....

(5) The contractor will furnish all information and reports required by
Executive Order 11246 of September 24,1965, and by the rules, regulations, and
orders of the Secretary of Labor, or pursuant thereto, [sic] and will permit
access to his books, records, and accounts by the contracting agency and the
Secretary of Labor for purposes of investigation to ascertain compliance with
such rules, regulations, and orders.
Id. 8 60-1.4(a).
33. Id. 8 60-1.3 (emphasis added).
34. Id. § 60-1.5. These include, for example, instances where work is performed outside the United States by persons not recruited within the United States, id. § 601.5(a)(3); contracts with state and local governments, id. 4 60-1.5(a)(4); and cases where
noncompliance is required for national security purposes, id. § 60-1.5(c).
35. Id. $4 60-1.25 to 1.32. The Office of Federal Contract Compliance has the responsibility of enforcing the equal employment provisions. See note 17 supra. The ultimate
sanction under administrative enforcement proceedings is debarment of a business from
any additional government contracts. To date, 14 companies have been debarred, and
three are awaiting a final debarment proceeding; six companies have debarment proceedings pending. See [I9771 FED.CONT.REP. (BNA) No. 686, A-9, No. 694, C-1.
36. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.27 (1976), as amended by 42 Fed. Reg. 3457 (1977) and 42 Fed.
Reg. 5978 (1977).
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The instant case presents an issue never before confronted by
the courts.37Although the Executive Order refers only to "contracts" and contractor^,"^^ the implementing regulations define
government contracts as including "any agreement or modification thereof . . . for the furnishing of supplies or service^."^^
While NOPSI clearly falls within the coverage of the regulations,
the question arises whether the utility is a contracting party as
contemplated by Executive Order 11,246. Unlike previous
cases," the principal issue in NOPSI is not the validity of the
Executive Order-rather the instant case involves the scope
of the Order. The issue presented is whether the Secretary of
Labor exceeded his rulemaking authority by extending the
Order's coverage to businesses that have a duty to provide service
to the government because of a state or local fran~hise.~'

Reasoning that great deference should be given administrative interpretations, Judge Ainsworth, writing for the majority,
found "that the [Labor] Department acted within the scope of
the Order in applying the Order to NOPSI."42 The court found
that NOPSI's lack of consent to the provisions would not disallow
a finding of the necessary contractual r e l a t i ~ n s h i pThe
. ~ ~fact that
37. See 553 F.2d a t 468. One previously litigated case involved a utility company
employee whose discrimination suit was based upon, inter alia, the provisions of Executive
Order 11,246. In that case the district court ruled that the Order did not provide a basis
for individual complaints. Consequently, the court never reached the issue of whether
utilities are covered by the Executive Order. Bradford v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 60
F.R.D. 432 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
38. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 8 202,3 C.F.R. 173 (1973), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
app., a t 10,294 (1970).
39. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.3(m) (1976), as amended by 42 Fed. Reg. 3457 (1977).
40. Notes 25-29 and accompanying text supra.
41. The court addressed two issues which are beyond the scope of this Case Note.
First, NOPSI contended, on the authority of See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967),
that administrative searches conducted in accordance with the Order were unreasonable
searches and seizures. Brief for Appellant at 20-26. The court distinguished See by noting
that the holding did not necessarily apply to regulated industries. The court also quoted
United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 317 (1972), which upheld an unconsented search
under federal statute of a firearms dealer, stating that in NOPSI, as in Biswell, "the
possibilities of abuse and the threat to privacy are not of impressive dimensions." 553 F.2d
at 470-72.
Second, the court dealt with the issue of enforcement, holding that, while the lower
court properly found NOPSI to be covered by the Executive Order, "the task of obtaining
NOPSI's compliance with the program should be left to the Government's own administrative compliance processes." Id. See generally notes 8 & 35 supra.
42. 553 F.2d a t 465.
43. Id. at 468-70. The district court had also ruled that NOPSI executed a contract
with the government subsequent to the issuance of the Order. The conditions imposed by
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NOPSI had for many years sold millions of dollars worth of utility
services to federal agencies was sufficient evidence of such a relati~nship.~"The
court stated that although utilities operate under
local franchises, they render "services to individual customers
pursuant to contracts, whether written or parol, and whether explicit or implicit in the parties' course of dealing."45Of particular
importance to the majority was the fact that NOPSI enjoyed a
monopoly, and that to allow NOPSI to prevail in the case would
force the government to acquiesce since the services provided by
NOPSI are essential?
Judge Clark filed a dissent contending that the Executive
Order refers only to contracts.47NOPSI, by virtue of the conditions imposed by its franchise, had a preexisting legal duty to
perform services for the government, and thus in Judge Clark's
view there was no genuine contract between the government and
NOPSI." Since the Order was addressed only to contracts, he
concluded that neither the Order nor its implementing regulations should apply to NOPSI.4D

This Case Note examines the scope of authority granted to
an administrator in implementing the provisions of an executive
order and considers the contractual relationship that exists between NOPSI and the government. In addition, the implications
the Order apply only to those contracts entered into subsequent to the issuance of the
Order in 1965. NOPSI7s original agreement to supply the government's NASA facility
expired according to its own terms in 1970. At that time NASA sought to execute a formal
agreement with NOPSI including the nondiscrimination provisions of Exec. Order 11,246.
NOPSI refused, but consented to continue supplying services to NASA in the absence of
a formal agreement. The lower court concluded that the agreement to continue supplying
services subjected NOPSI to the Order. Id. a t 462-63.
The Court of Appeals indicated that although there were no specific contractual
arrangements between NOPSI and the government, "[tlhe long-standing sellerpurchaser relationship indisputedly makes NOPSI a government contractor and further
contractual underpinning is unnecessary for our holding." Id. a t 463 n.3.
44. Id. a t 469.
45. Id.
46. Id. a t 470. NOPSI is the only utility company supplying service to the area where
the government's NASA Assembly Facility is located. United States v. New Orleans Pub.
Serv., Inc., 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. a t 6315, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. a t 1090. In the words of
Judge Ainsworth, the holding was influenced by the fact that NOPSI "(1) enjoys special
economic advantages, including a monopoly, and (2) sells directly to the Government."
553 F.2d a t 468.
47. 553 F.2d a t 476 (Clark, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 478.
49. Id. at 476-78.
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of the decision are discussed and a rationale presented that would
support a holding contrary to the one reached in the instant case.

A. Administrative Interpretation and Implementation of
Executive Orders
The regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to
Executive Order 11,246 state specifically that the Order is binding upon utilities providing service to a government agency."
Thus, an essential question is whether the Secretary exceeded his
rulemaking authority by including utilities-specifically those
required by their franchise agreements to supply energy to all
customers-with those services covered by the Order?
1. Power of an administrative agency to adopt rules and
regulations

Rules issued by an executive agency pursuant to a statute
have been upheld by the courts as long as the rules have not
extended beyond the ambit of the legislatively granted authority.
The Supreme Court in Mourning u. Family Publications Service,
Inc. stated that "the validity of a regulation promulgated under
[a statute] will be sustained as long as it is 'reasonably related
to the purposes of the enabling legislation.' "52
In the interest of administrative efficiency, the courts have
indicated that an administrator would be given significant latitude in promulgating rules under a statute.53Limitations on this
discretion have been recognized, however:
The power of an administrative officer or board to administer a federal statute and to prescribe rules and regulations to
that end is not the power to make law-for no such power can
50. 41 C.F.R. $ 60-1.3-1.4(a) (1976), as amended by 42 Fed. Reg. 3457 (1977) and 42
Fed. Reg. 5978 (1977).
51. See notes 30-41 and accompanying text supra.
52. 411 U S . 356, 369 (1973). The Court went on to say:
The standard to be applied in determining whether the Board exceeded the
authority delegated to it under the Truth in Lending Act is well established
under our prior cases. Where the empowering provision of a statute states simply
that the agency may "make . . . such rules and regulations as may be necessary
to carry out the provisions of this Act," we have held that the validity of a
regulation promulgated thereunder will be sustained as long as it is "reasonably
related to the purposes of the enabling legislation."
Id. (quoting Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S. 268, 280-81 (1969)) (footnote omitted).
53. See note 59 and accompanying text infra.
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be delegated by Congress-but the power to adopt regulations
to carry into effect the will of Congress as expressed by statute.5J

Regulations issued pursuant to an executive order have also been
held valid, although the latitude which an administrator enjoys
in promulgating such regulations is less clearly defined?
One may conclude that the courts apply a standard to regulations under executive orders similar to that applied to regulations issued pursuant to statute." In upholding the regulations
under Executive Order 11,246, the court in Contractors Association v. Secretaly of Labor indicated that "[a]dministrative action pursuant to an Executive Order is invalid and subject to
judicial review if beyond the scope of the Executive Order."57
Still, the question remains whether regulations under executive
orders should be given "great deference" in determining whether
they fall within the scope of the order.
2.

Validity of the regulations i n the instant case

After citing the guideline set forth by the Contractors
Association court, the NOPSI majority indicated that in determining whether the regulations were within the scope of the
Order, the court was bound to give "special deference to the
Each of the three cases
Labor Department's interpretati~n."~~
which the court cited as authority for granting special deference,"
however, involved administrative rulings and interpretations issued pursuant to statutes which specifically granted to an agency
authority over the issue in question.60In the instant case, the
regulations were issued pursuant to an executive order; there is
54. Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936). Accord,
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,213-14 (1976);Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S.
68, 74 (1965).
55. See notes 58-62 and accompanying text infra.
56. See Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955).
57. 442 F.2d at 175 (citing Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955)).
58. 553 F.2d at 465.
59. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1
(1965); Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers,
367 U.S. 396 (1961).
60. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965), for example, involved an administrative
interpretation by the Secretary of the Interior of an executive order regarding the use of
federal land in Alaska. While the Court upheld the interpretation, it noted that the
Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, Pub. L. No. 146, 41 Stat. 437 (current version a t 30 U.S.C.
$0 181-287 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974)) "gave the Secretary of the Interior broad power to
issue oil and gas leases on public lands." 380 U.S. at 4. While the Court ruled specifically
on the validity of the Secretary's interpretation of the order, an argument can be made
that the Secretary's authority was supported by statutory underpinning.,
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no statute expressly empowering the Secretary to issue such regulation~.~
Thus,
'
even though under Contractors Association administrative regulations may be valid if within the scope of an
executive order, there is no precedent requiring that such regulations be given special deference by the court?'
In the absence of special deference, a court could well conclude that the regulations involved in the instant case are outside
the scope of Executive Order 11,246. First, the Order mentions
only contracts, yet the regulations apply whether a formal contract exists or not; an agreement to supply services is sufficient.
Second, the regulations eliminate the requirement of consent-a
necessary element of an enforceable contractM-with respect to
utilities that are required by their local franchises to supply service to all who request it.64 Finally, the strength of the Order
derives from the economic incentive to comply with its provisions
in exchange for lucrative government contracts. Because the regulations apply to utilities that have no choice in accepting the
government's business, the force of the Order is changed from
contractual leverage to sovereign authority. These three arguments are examined in the following sections.

B. Contract Law
1. Applicability of general contract principles to government
contracts
Judge Clark dissented on the grounds that the Secretary exceeded the scope of his authority by applying the Order to all
<
agreements," rather than limiting its coverage to formal contracts, and that a contract as commonly understood in the law
~~
did not exist between NOPSI and the g o ~ e r n m e n t .Judge
Clark's opinion emphasized the importance of following general
4

61. The courts have premised the Secretary of Labor's authority to draft the regulations on the power granted by $ 201 of the Order. See, e.g., United States v. New Orleans
Pub. Serv., Inc., 553 F.2d 459, 463 (5th Cir. 1977), petition for cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W.
3243 (U.S. Sept. 30,1977) (No. 77-497); Contractors Ass'n. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d
159, 171 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971).
62. Support for not extending that deference lies in the judicial hesitation to permit
executive rulemaking where Congress has not specifically extended that authority. See
Remmert, Executive Order 11,246: Executive Encroachment, 55 A.B.A.J. 1037 (1969).
63. 1 A. CORBIN,CONTRACTS
$$ 3, 9, 11, 12 (1963); 1 S. WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS
99 1,
2, 18, 22 (3d ed. 1957).
64. United States v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 553 F.2d 459, 469 (5th Cir. 1977),
petition for cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3243 (U.S. Sept. 30, 1977) (No. 77-497). See note 84
infra.
65. 553 F.2d a t 476.
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contract principles in determining the relationship between
NOPSI and the government. Such a course, he contended, would
have led to a finding by the court that NOPSI was not a party to
. ~ ~ not specifically ada contract as commonly u n d e r ~ t o o dWhile
dressing this contention, the majority avoided the argument by
asserting that "[glovernment contracts are different from contracts between ordinary persons."67Although the authority cited
by the courtaRsupports this proposition, it does so only in those
instances where an exception to general contract law has been
provided for by a statute or regulation6gthat existed at the time
the enforceable contract was executed.70In the absence of such an
exception, general contract principles apply: "It is customary,
where Congress has not adopted a different standard, to apply to
the construction of government contracts the principles of general
contract law."71Had the court in the instant case applied general
contract principles, a different result would have been reached.
2. Absence of valid consideration for a contract between NOSPI
and the government
NOPSI's franchise with the city requires the utility to supply
power to any requesting party located within NOPSI'S area of
coverage.72Thus, as Judge Clark argued, NOPSI was supplying
power to the government because of a preexisting legal duty arising out of NOPSI's contract with the city. Because a promise to
render a performance already required is not sufficient consideration for a return promise,73any promise by the government in
.~~
exchange for NOPSI's services would be ~ n e n f o r c e a b l eTherefore, Judge Clark concluded, there exists no mutuality of obliga66. Id. a t 476-79.
67. Id. a t 469.
68. M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289, 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Vacketta
& Wheeler, A Government Contractor's Right to Abandon Performance, 65 GEO.L.J. 27
(1976).
69. See M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289, 1299-1301 (D.C. Cir. 1971);
Russell Motor Car Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 514, 517-18 (1923).
70. Russell Motor Car Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 514, 517-18 (1923).
71. Priebe & Sons v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 411 (1947). Priebe presented the
question of whether a provision in a government contract for liquidated damages should
be denied enforcement on the grounds that i t constituted a penalty. Citing the common
and useful function of liquidated damages in commercial transactions, the Court ruled
that such damages were reasonable and enforceable. Id. a t 410-12. Accord, Security Life
& Accident Ins. Co. v. United States, 357 F.2d 145, 148 (5th Cir. 1966).
72. 553 F.2d a t 469.
73. 1A. CORBIN,
CONTRACTS
1) 143 (1963); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS
§ 76A
CONTRACTS
§ 132 (3d ed. 1957).
(Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7, rev. & edited 1973); 1S. WILLISTON,
74. United States v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 553 F.2d a t 478.
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tion between NOPSI and the government, and as a result no
contract could have been formed.75For an enforceable contract
between NOPSI and the government to be created, NOPSI would
have to agree to do more than merely fulfill its preexisting legal
duty.76Although the argument of lack of valid consideration provides one means for reaching an opposite decision, a more compelling argument is the absence of consent by the utility.
3. The element of consent

A fundamental element of all contracts is mutuality of assent
and agreement to all the terms of the contract.77The majority in
NOPSI, however, held that agreement to certain conditions is
unnecessary "where regulations apply and require the inclusion
of a contract clause in every contract . . . even if it has not been
expressly included in a written contract or agreed to by the parties."78The court cited ample authority for this ~ontention.~VI'he
instant case may be distinguished, however, by the fact that the
aggrieved parties in the cited cases actively sought to enter into
contracts to perform services for the government after the regulations in question had been issued, while NOPSI never entered
into a contract with the government subsequent to the issuance
of the Order. Although the NOPSI court found that the providing
of utility services to the government was evidence of a contract,80
the fact remains that NOPSI never consented to the terms which
the government sought to impose.

C. Implications of the NOPSI Decision
With the decision in NOPSI, the government has been
granted the authority in certain instances to impose additional
terms and conditions subsequent to the original agreement of the
party without the government assuming additional duties. This
authority is an extremely powerful tool that would ordinarily be
75. Id.
76. Id. See 1A A. CORBIN,
CONTRACTS
Q 192 (1963); 1 S. WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS
4 132
(3d ed. 1957).
Q 3 (1963); 1 S. WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS
Q 1 (3d ed.
77. See 1 A. CORBIN,
CONTRACTS
1957).
78. 553 F.2d at 469.
79. Russell Motor Car Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 514 (1923); M. Steinthal & Co.
v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1971); J.W. Bateson Co. v. United States, 162 Ct.
C1. 566 (1963); G.L. Christian & Assoc. v. United States, 312 F.2d 418 (Ct. Cl.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 954 (1963).
80. 553 F.2d at 469.
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denied to any contracting party. The court's willingness to extend
such a power evidences a strong desire to (1)eliminate discriminatory employment practices and (2) protect the government
from being forced to do business with those who may engage in
such practices. While the objectives of the government in the
instant case are laudable, the granting of such a formidable
weapon presents significant implications which the court should
have considered.
I.

Administrative authority in interpreting executive orders

The decision suggests that administrators are given a substantial degree of freedom in implementing executive orders, even
in the absence of explicit statutory authorization, and that strict
interpretation is not required to establish a regulation's validity.
While the limits on such administrative action are not yet clearly
defined, the instant case would seem to represent judicial approval of this previously untested exercise of executive authority.
2. The force of the Order before and after NOPSI
The considerable federal purchasing power makes the government a n attractive customer to many private contractors.
Compliance with terms or conditions not encountered in the
course of ordinary business is a price that most contractors willingly pay in exchange for the government's business? It is the
government's strong economic bargaining position that provides
the force behind the nondiscrimination requirements of the various executive orders and t h a t gives the government another
means of achieving desirable national objective^.^^
The decision in the instant case represents a shift away from
the traditional use of contractual leverage in achieving government objectives. As the dictum in Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co.
suggests," the power of the government to fix certain terms and
conditions upon which it will deal derives not from its sovereign
81. Evidence of this is found in the large amount of business conducted between the
government and the private sector. Despite the stated intention of the Secretary of Labor
to enforce the nondiscrimination provisions, only 14 companies have been debarred from
government contracts. See [I9771 FED.CONT.REP.(BNA) No. 686, A-9, No. 694, C-1.
82. "The fundamental principle underlying the Presidential power to require nondiscrimination by contractors is found in the power of the Federal Government to set conditions upon [sic] which anyone desiring to do business with the United States must
meet." Joyce vTMcCrane, 320 F. Supp. 1284, 1290 (D.N.J. 1970) (emphasis added).
83. 310 U.S.113, 127 (1940). For the language of the Court, see text accompanying
note 21 supra.
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authority but rather from the freedom to contract that every individual enjoys. NOPSI significantly broadens executive authority
beyond that of contractual leverage. The elements of choice or
consent that were present in all previously litigated cases involving government contractors and Executive Order 11,246 are absent in the instant case.R4By way of contrast, it is extremely
doubtful that any private party receiving service from NOPSI
could require this type of performance by NOPSI. Therefore, with
respect to businesses that are required by their state or local
franchise to provide service to the government, it is clear that the
force of the Order is not one of simple economics, but represents,
under the guise of contract law, an exercise of the federal government's sovereign power in pursuit of certain national objectives.
3. An alternative solution

A decision for NOPSI in the instant case would not have
thwarted the nondiscrimination objectives of the Executive
Order. The majority indicated t h a t a decision favorable to
NOPSI would have forced upon the government the dilemma of
either acquiescing or going without the necessary services.85The
court reasoned that "a valid and important nationwide federal
program . . . could be nullified by any seller with a monopoly in
a service," supply or property needed by the Government, just by
84. The court concedes that NOPSI never consented to the nondiscrimination provisions. 553 F.2d a t 469. The court suggests that NOPSI's original agreement with the city
to supply utility services to the area committed NOPSI to the provisions: "Acceptance of
the benefits of the local franchises subjected NOPSI to the obligations attached thereto
. . . . When NOPSI undertook to satisfy those obligations by selling energy to the Government, the company did so according to the terms imposed by the Government." Id.
at 467-70 (citation omitted).
It is interesting to note that the NOPSI franchise was granted in 1922,43 years prior
to the Executive Order. United States v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 8 Empl. Prac. Dec.
at 6315,8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. a t 1090. The court seems to suggest that NOPSI's original
acceptance of the franchise operates as objective consent to all duties that may arise as a
result of the franchise, even though in the instant case subjective consent by NOPSI is
clearly absent. While this raises the issue of subjective versus objective consent (see
Bronaugh, Agreement, Mistake, .and Objectivity in the Bargain Theory of Contract, 18
L. REV. 213 (1976); Samek, The Objective Theory of Contract and the Rule
WM. & MARY
in L'Estrange v. Graucob, 52 CAN.B. REV.351 (1974)), it is unreasonable to suggest that
NOPSI's acceptance of the franchise operates as consent to terms imposed later, not by
the city which granted the franchise, but by a customer, the federal government.
85. 553 F.2d a t 470.
86. The majority emphasized that it was NOPSI's monopolistic position that necessitated a holding for the government. An interesting question arises when one considers a
possible situation where the government needs services in an area where there exists an
oligopoly with regard to the desired services, and each member of the oligopoly refuses to
comply with the provisions of the Executive Order. If, for example, there were two utilities
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virtue of the seller's economic p ~ s i t i o n . "However,
~~
had the
Order and regulations been held inapplicable to NOPSI in this
case, the objectives of the Executive Order would not have been
nullified with respect to those contractors who have sought government contracts. A decision favorable to NOPSI would pertain
only to businesses whose relationship with the government resulted from the government's right to compel the contractor's
service according to the conditions of a preexisting state or local
franchise.
In addition, a holding for NOPSI would not have given the
utility the opportunity to engage in discriminatory employment
practices. There are other means available to the government to
prevent abuse by employers. Under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964," employers such as NOPSI are barred from engaging
in employment d i s c r i m i n a t i ~ n Employees,
.~~
their representatives, or the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission can
file a charge alleging abuse by an employer.g0If the employer fails
to enter into a conciliation agreement within 30 days after the
charge is filed, the Commission may bring a civil action against
the ~ffender.~'
If a court finds the employer has intentionally
engaged in an unlawful employment practice, "the court may
enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order affirmative action as may be appropriate."92 Thus, NOPSI would still be required to observe lawful
employment procedures even without the force of Executive
Order 11,246.
capable of servicing NASA's facility and both refused to comply, could the government
both require service and force compliance? Following the reasoning of the NOPSI majority, such a result is conceivable. As the court indicated, if a utility were allowed to prevail,
"the Government would have to either acquiesce or else go without necessary services.
Obviously a local utility cannot force such a dilemma upon the Government." Id.
87. Id.
88. 42 U.S.C. Q Q 2000e, 2000e-1 to -15, 2004, 2005 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974).
89. Id. Q 2000e-2. An "employer," with minor exceptions not relevant here, is one
"engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each
working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar
year. . . ." Id. Q 2000e(b).
90. Id Q 2000e-5(b). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, created by
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Q 2000e-4(a) (1970), should not be confused with
the CEEO. Note 16 and accompanying text supra.
91. Id. Q 2000e-5(f)(l). If the case involves a government, governmental agency, or
political subdivision, the civil action will be brought by the Attorney General. Id.
92. Id. Q 2000e-5(g).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Fifth Circuit's holding demonstrates a willingness to
allow the executive to impose significant contractual obligations,
including keeping records, providing the government with access
to those records, and implementing an affirmative action program,g3without the consent of the utility. A better reasoned
course would have been to hold the provisions of Executive Order
11,246 inapplicable to all public utilities required to provide services to the government because of duties imposed by their state
or local franchises. Alternative remedies such as Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 196P4 could still be invoked to prevent employment discrimination practices. Such a result would have
maintained the effectiveness of the Executive Order in combating
discrimination, without unnecessarily extending executive authority and violating fundamental principles of contract law.
93. See notes 4-5 and accompanying text supra.
94. Notes 88-92 and accompanying text supra.

